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Abstract. Compared with two-level quantum key distribution (QKD), high-
dimensional QKD enable two distant parties to share a secret key at a higher rate.
We provide a finite-key security analysis for the recently proposed practical high-
dimensional decoy-state QKD protocol based on time-energy entanglement. We employ
two methods to estimate the statistical fluctuation of the postselection probability and
give a tighter bound on the secure-key capacity. By numerical evaluation, we show
the finite-key effect on the secure-key capacity in different conditions. Moreover, our
approach could be used to optimize parameters in practical implementations of high-
dimensional QKD.
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3] allows two authorized parties, Alice and Bob,
to establish secret keys. However, the key generating rate is limited by various hardware
constraints, such as the optical state generation and detection efficiency. To remedy this
defect, a promising approach is high-dimensional QKD (HD-QKD). HD-QKD enables
participants to maximize the secret-key capacity under technical constraints by encoding
each photon with more than 1 bit of information. Moreover, compared with two-level
QKD protocols, HD-QKD protocols are more robust to noise [4]. HD-QKD encodes
information in various photonic degrees of freedom, including position-momentum [5],
time [6, 7, 8, 9], time-energy [10, 11, 12] and orbital angular momentum [13, 14]. So
when photons are measured in such a high-dimensional Hilbert space, more than 1 bit
of secure information can be shared by two parties per single-photon detected.
Recently, based on dispersive optics and time-energy entanglement, Jacob Mower
et al. [15] proposed a high-dimensional QKD scenario, which is called dispersive optics
QKD (DO-QKD) and proved its security against Gaussian collective attacks [16, 17].
Instead of quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the BB84 QKD protocol, the security proof
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of DO-QKD uses the decrease in measurement correlations to estimate the amount of
leaked information to the eavesdropper Eve. In DO-QKD, it is assumed that the photon
pair produced by spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) is an on-demand
single-pair. However, because of the imperfection of the source [18, 19], multi-pair
emissions are always inevitable in real situation, causing the protocol is vulnerable to
the photon number splitting (PNS) attack [20, 21, 22] in lossy channels. In order to
overcome the PNS attack, the decoy state method has been proposed [23]. Recently,
Zheshen Zhang et al. [24] extended the decoy state method to the DO-QKD scenario for
an infinite number of decoy states, which is impractical. Instead of an infinite number
of decoy states, Darius Bunandar et al. [25] presented a practical decoy-state HD-QKD
scheme and analyzed its security and feasibility. The analysis of decoy-state HD-QKD
showed that under realistic experimental parameters, the security of HD-QKD with only
two decoy states can approach the protocol with an infinite number of decoy states. In
other words, the HD-QKD protocol with two decoy states is practical and feasible.
The resource to establish secure keys is finite in practical implementations of QKD and
many studies about the effect of finite-key have been finished [27, 26, 28, 29]. So, how
finite resources effect the security of the decoy-state HD-QKD protocol is worth further
studying.
Catherine Lee et al. [30] have analyzed the finite-key effect on the security of
the HD-QKD protocol without decoy states. In this paper, we analyze the security
of a practical decoy-state HD-QKD protocol with finite resources. We consider
statistical fluctuations in parameter estimation step in the finite-key regime. We employ
two statistical methods to estimate the statistical fluctuation in Alice’s and Bob’s
measurements and derive tight finite-key security bounds. By numerical evaluation,
we evaluate the finite-key effect on the performance of the decoy-state HD-QKD with
realistic constraints.
The paper is organized as follow: In Sec. 2, we briefly describe the decoy-state
HD-QKD protocol. Sec. 3 introduces the formulas and two methods that are used
in our finite-key analysis. Sec. 4 presents the fluctuation range and derives a tight
security bound on the secure-key capacity with finite resources. The results of numerical
evaluation are presented In Sec. 5. The conclusion is summarized in Sec. 6.
2. Protocol description
The time-energy entanglement-based HD-QKD protocol that we consider is illustrated
in Figure 1. We assume that setups are completely controlled by Alice and Bob
respectively. The quantum channel and the classical channel are authenticated. In
our security analysis, for simplicity, Alice and Bob generate raw keys and estimate
parameters in two bases separately [31].In particular, we extract the secret key from the
coincidence that Alice and Bob both detect photons in arrival-time basis (T basis) and
estimate parameters in dispersive-time basis (D basis). In addition, the source intensity
is selected randomly in one of the three intensities µ, v1 and v2, satisfying µ > v1 + v2
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Figure 1: (Color online) Schematic of the HD-QKD setup. Alice holds the source, keeps
one of a pair of photons produced by SPDC and sends the other to Bob. In case 1, Alice
measures in the dispersed-time basis. In case 2, Alice measures in arrival-time basis.
When Bob measures in the same basis as Alice, their measurements are correlated. ND
is normal dispersion and AD is anomalous dispersion.
and v1 > v2 ≥ 0. The protocol is descripted as follows:
(i) State preparation: Alice chooses independently an intensity λ ∈
{µ, v1, v2|µ > v1 + v2, v1 > v2 ≥ 0} with probabilities pµ, pv1 and 1 − pµ − pv1 and
generates a biphoton state by SPDC. She keeps one of the biphoton and sends the
other to Bob via a quantum channel.
(ii) State measurement: Alice and Bob select a basis at {T, D}. Both select T basis
with the same probability pT and select D basis with the probability 1− pT . Then
they perform measurements independently. After their measurements, Alice and
Bob record their own outcomes respectively.
(iii) Classical information post-processing: After all N laser pulses are
transmitted, Alice and Bob publish their basis and intensity choices over an
authenticated public channel. To perform parameter estimation, Alice and Bob also
announce their outcomes in D basis. They establish their distilled keys only from
correlated timing events acquired in T basis. Note that we define N as the number
of laser pulses sent by Alice to Bob. After measuring postselection probabilities
and multipliers, Alice and Bob can calculate Eve’s Holevo information and then
detect Eve’s influence so that they can determine their information advantage over
Eve. If the advantage is much greater than zero, they then apply error correction
and privacy amplification on their data. As a result, some amount of secret key
can be established.
3. Formulas and methods
First, we shall introduce the postselection probability in general decoy-state QKD
protocols, which is the probability of Alice and Bob registering at least one detection
(due to a photon or a dark count) in a single measurement frame [25].
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The entangled photon-pair from the SPDC source exhibits approximate Poisson
distribution [18, 33]. Suppose the intensity of Alice’s SPDC source is λ, in a single
measurement frame, the probability Prn of generating n-photon pairs is
Prn =
λn
n!
e−λ. (1)
Then the postselection probability can be written as
Pλ =
∞∑
n=0
Prnγn =
∞∑
n=0
λn
n!
e−λγn, (2)
where, γn is the conditional probability of measuring at least one detection given n-
photon pairs are emitted. With Eve’s absence, we have [25]
γn = [1− (1− ηAlice)n (1− pd)] [1− (1− ηBobηT )n (1− pd)] . (3)
Here, ηAlice and ηBob are Alice and Bob’s detector efficiencies respectively. ηT is
the transmittance of the quantum channel and pd is the dark count rate in a single
measurement frame. In principle, Eve has the ability to affect the value of γn. Decoy
states are utilized to estimate the γn values from the postselection probabilities of
different choices of λ and then Eve’s effect on the security can be estimated.
We consider ε-security [34, 35], where ε corresponds to the failure probability of
the entire protocol. ε is limited by other small parameters and has
ε = εPE + εEC + ε¯+ εPA. (4)
All parameters εPE, εEC, ε¯ and εPA can independently be fixed at arbitrarily low values:
(i) εPE is the failure probability of parameter estimation procedure and can be made
as low as desired simply by increasing the size of the sample used for parameter
estimation.
(ii) εEC is the failure probability of error correction procedure and can be decreased by
computing a hash of Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings after the reconciliation respectively
and comparing it publicly.
(iii) ε¯ is a smooth min-entropy parameter and εPA is the failure probability of privacy
amplification procedure. Both of them are virtual parameters and can be optimized
in the computation.
So we can chose security parameter to an arbitrarily small value.
The finite-size secure-key capacity for the HD-QKD protocol can be rewritten as
[34, 35]:
∆I = RHD− 1
pµp2TN
log2
2
εEC
− 2
pµp2TN
log2
1
εPA
−(2d+ 3)
√
1
pµp2TN
log2
2
ε¯
.(5)
Zhang [24] has given out the RHD expression in the decoy-state HD-QKD protocol:
RHD = βI (A;B)− (1−Kµ)IR −KµφUBζt,ζω (A;E) . (6)
Here, as it’s described in Ref[24, 25], β is the reconciliation efficiency and Kµ =
µe−µγ1/Pµ is the fraction of postselected events. IR is the number of random bits
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shared between Alice and Bob, which is log2d here. I (A;B) is the mutual information
between Alice and Bob. φUBζt,ζω (A;E) is an upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information
under Gaussian collective attacks given the excess-noise factor ζt and ζω for the timing
and the frequency correlations, respectively.
Then combing Eq. 5 and Eq. 6, we obtain the finite-size secure-key capacity for the
decoy-state HD-QKD protocol:
∆I = βI (A;B)− (1−Kµ)IR −KµφUBζt,ζω (A;E)−
1
pµp2TN
log2
2
εEC
− 2
pµp2TN
log2
1
εPA
− (2d+ 3)
√
1
pµp2TN
log2
2
ε¯
(7)
4. Parameter estimation in finite-key
We extend the decoy-state analysis proposed in Ref. [25] to the case of finite-key. In
the two decoy-state condition, the value of γ0 and γ1 satisfy

γ
LB,{v1,v2}
0 = max
{
v1P
−
v2
ev2−v2P+v1ev1
v1−v2 , p
2
d
}
γ
UB,{v1,v2}
0 = pd
γ
LB,{v1,v2}
0 ≤ γ0 ≤ γUB,{v1,v2}0
(8)
and
γ1 ≥ µ
µv1 − µv2 − v21 + v22
[
P−v1e
v1 − P+v2ev2 −
v21 − v22
µ2
(
P+µ e
µ − γ0
)]
, (9)
where v1 and v2 are two different decoy-state intensities, and pd is dark count rate.
Besides, Pλ is the measured result and satisfies the relationship:
P±λ = Pλ ±∆(N, εPE) . (10)
Here, ∆ (N, εPE) is the fluctuation range of the postselection Pλ which is related to N
and εPE. We will show the accurate expression of ∆ in Eq. 20 and Eq. 23 in Sec. 4 with
different approaches.
By combining Eq. 8, Eq. 9 and Eq. 10, we can get a lower bound on Kµ:
Kµ =
µe−µγ1
Pµ
≥ µe
−µγ1
P+µ
=
µ2
µv1 − µv2 − v21 + v22
×
[
P−v1
P+µ
ev1−µ − P
+
v2
P+µ
ev2−µ − v
2
1 − v22
µ2
(
1− γ
LB,{v1,v2}
0 e
−µ
P+µ
)]
. (11)
In the other hand, we can obtain another lower bound on Kµ by using the postselection
probability of one of two decoy states directly:
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Kµ =
µe−µγ1
Pµ
≥ µe
−µγ1
P+µ
=
µ2
µλ− λ2
[
P−λ
P+µ
eλ−µ − λ
2
µ2
− µ
2 − λ2
µ2
γ
UB,{v1,v2}
0 e
−µ
P+µ
]
.(12)
Here, λ = v1 or v2 if v2 6= 0 or λ = v1 if v2 = 0.
Therefore, combining Eq. 11 and Eq. 12, we get
Kµ ≥ KLB,{v1,v2}µ = max
{
µ2
µv1 − µv2 − v21 + v22[
P−v1
P+µ
ev1−µ − P
+
v2
P+µ
ev2−µ −v
2
1 − v22
µ2
(
1− γ
LB,{v1,v2}
0 e
−µ
P+µ
)]
, (13)
µ2
µλ− λ2
[
P−λ
P+µ
eλ−µ− λ
2
µ2
− µ
2 − λ2
µ2
γ
UB,{v1,v2}
0 e
−µ
P+µ
]}
.
The excess noise is the noise added by the channel beyond the fundamental shot
noise and corresponds to information loss in the QKD system. In the HD-QKD protocol,
timing and frequency excess noise, ζt and ζω, are used to parameterize the decrease,
caused by Eve’s attack, in the correlations of Alice and Bobs measurements. Their
respective average multipliers Φt,λ and Φω,λ could be measured by Alice and Bob, and
have the following relationship [25]
Φx,λ = Kλ (1 + ζx) + (1−Kλ)∆Φx, (14)
for x = t or ω and λ ∈ {µ, v1, v2}.
Similar to analysis in Kµ , the upper bound on excess noise can be obtained:
ζx ≤ ζUB,{v1,v2}x = min
{
min
{
µe−µ
(λ1 − λ2)KLB,{v1,v2}µ
(15)
×
(
Φx,λ1
P+λ1
P+µ
eλ1 − Φx,λ2
P−λ2
P+µ
eλ2
)}
, min
{
eλ−µ
µP+λ
λP+µ
Φx,λ
K
LB,{v1,v2}
µ
}}
− 1,
where, x = t or ω, λ, λ1, λ2 ∈ {µ, v1, v2} and λ1 > λ2. In the single decoy-state condition,
bounds on Kµ and ζx,λ can be directly deduced:
Kµ ≥ KLB,{v}µ =
µ2
µv − v2
[
P−v
P+µ
ev−µ− v
2
µ2
− µ
2 − v2
µ2
γ
UB,{v}
0 e
−µ
P+µ
]
, (16)
and
ζx ≤ ζUB,{v}x = min
{
µ
(µ− v)KLB,{v}µ
(
Φx,µ − Φx,vP
−
v
P+µ
ev−µ
)
,
min
λ∈{µ,v}
{
eλ−µ
µP+λ
λP+µ
Φx,λ
K
LB,{v1,v2}
µ
}}
− 1, (17)
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for x = t or ω.
In most of finite-key analysis in QKD schemes, for independent and random
measurements, Hoeffding’s inequality [36] and Chernoff bound [37] are always used in
statistical fluctuation analysis [38, 39]. Therefore, we take Hoeffding’s inequality and
Chernoff bound respectively to deal with the statistical fluctuation.
Suppose the intensity of photons used in parameter estimation is λ, we denote the
number of the photon as Nλ. In particular, Nλ is expressed as pλ (1− pT )2N in the
decoy-state HD-QKD.
Lemma 1. [36] Let X1, X2,...,Xn, be a set of independent Bernoulli random variables
that satisfy P (Xi = 1) = pi, and let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and α = E (X) =
∑n
i=1 pi, where
E (·) denotes the mean value. Let β be the observed outcome of X for a given trial (i.e.,
β ∈ N+). For certain εH , εˆH > 0, we have that β satisfies
β = α+ θH , (18)
except with error probability γ = εH + εˆH, where the parameter θH ∈ [−τH , τˆH ], with
τH = g (N, εH), τˆH = g (N, εˆH) and gH (x, y) =
√
x/2 ln (y−1). Here εH(εˆH) denotes
the probability that β < α− τH ( β > α + τˆH).
In particular, we suppose the intensity of photons used in parameter estimation
is λ and denote the number of the photon as Nλ. For simplifying analysis, we set
εPE = εH + εˆH and εH = εˆH . According to Lemma 1, we have
P ∗λNλ +
√
Nλ/2 ln (2ε−1) ≥ PλNλ ≥ P ∗λNλ −
√
Nλ/2 ln (2ε−1), (19)
where P ∗λ is the real value of the postselection probability. In detail, Nλ can be expressed
as pλ (1− pT )2N , so we obtain
∆ (N, εPE) = ∆H =
√
1
2pλ(1− pT )2N
ln
2
εPE
(20)
and
P±λ = Pλ ±
√
1
2pλ(1− pT )2N
ln
2
εPE
(21)
In the other hand, we consider multiplicative Chernoff bound [40, 41].
Lemma 2. [40] Let X1, X2,...,Xn, be a set of independent Bernoulli random variables
that satisfy P (Xi = 1) = pi, and let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and α = E (X) =
∑n
i=1 pi, where
E (·) denotes the mean value. Let β be the observed outcome of X for a given trial (i.e.,
β ∈ N+) and αL = β−
√
N/2 ln ǫ−1 for certain ǫ > 0. When
(
2ε−1C
)1/αL ≤ e[3/4√2]2 and(
εˆ−1C
)1/αL < e 13 for certain εC, εˆC > 0, we have that β satisfies
β = α + θC , (22)
except with error probability γ = ǫ + εC + ǫˆC , where the parameter θ ∈ [−τC , τˆC ], with
τC = g (β, ε
4
C/16), τˆC = g
(
β, ε
3/2
C
)
and g (x, y) =
√
2x ln (y−1). Here εC(εˆC) denotes
the probability that β < α− τC ( β > α + τˆC).
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When the amount of signals is great enough, in Lemma 2, the condition,(
2ε−1C
)1/αL ≤ e[3/4√2]2 and (εˆ−1C )1/αL < e 13 for certain εC, εˆC > 0, is met easily. Similar
to the above analysis, we set εPE = ǫ+ εC + εˆC and ǫ = εH = εˆH . Then we have

∆(N, εPE)
+ =
√
2Pλ
pλ(1−pT )2N ln
16
(εPE/3)
4
∆(N, εPE)
− =
√
2Pλ
pλ(1−pT )2N ln
1
(εPE/3)
3/2
(23)
and 

P+ = Pλ +
√
2Pλ
pλ(1−pT )2N ln
16
(εPE/3)
4
P− = Pλ −
√
2Pλ
pλ(1−pT )2N ln
1
(εPE/3)
3/2
(24)
After above discussion, we can make numerical evaluation for all case of the finite-key
practical decoy-state HD-QKD protocol analyzed in this paper.
5. Numerical evaluation
Here, we consider a fiber-based QKD system model that uses the recent decoy-state
HD-QKD protocol experimental parameters [25, 42]: propagation loss α =0.2 dB/km;
detector timing jitter δj = 20 ps; dark count rate Rdc = 1000s
−1; reconciliation efficiency
β = 0.9; IR = log2d. Then we have the transmittance ηT = 10
−αL/10, where L is the
length of the quantum channel in km. Besides, we also assume that Alice and Bob have
the same detector efficiencies: ηAlice = ηBob = 0.93 [43].
Our purpose is to test whether the protocol can be utilized to distill a secret key
for some given conditions, so, from this point of view, factors, pT and pλ, have little
effect on the final rate [35]. In particular, we let pT = 50% and pµ : pv1 : pv2 = 7 : 2 : 1
in the two decoy-state condition while pµ : pv = 4 : 1 in the one decoy-state condition.
We assume εPE = εEC = ε¯ = εPA = 10
−10 [44]. We take coherent time δcoh = 30 ps
or all d values and correlation time δcor = dδcoh, which is easily controlled [42]. The
measurement frame duration Tf is chosen to be Tf = 2
√
2 ln 2δcoh [24]. For simplicity, we
also assume two excess-noise factors are equal, ζt = ζω = ζ . The change in correlation
time due to Eve’s interaction can be assumed to be δ∆ =
(√
1 + ζ − 1) δcor = 10 ps [30],
which doesn’t lose generality.
Based on the Hoeffding’s inequality, Figure 2 plots the secure-key capacity of decoy-
state HD-QKD in the case of the Schmidt number d = 8 and µ= 0.01, 0.10 and 0.25.
Figure 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3 plot in the two-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol and Figure 2-4,
2-5 and 2-6 plot in the single-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol.
To compare effects of Hoeffding’s inequality and Chernoff bound in parameter
estimation, based on Chernoff bound, Figure 3 plots the secure-key capacity of decoy-
state HD-QKD in the case of the same condition as Figure 2. Figure 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3
plot in the two-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol and Figure 3-4, 3-5 and 3-6 plot in the
single-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol.
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Figure 2: (Color online) Finite-size secure-key capacities in bpc versus transmission
distance based on Hoeffding’s inequality. Top panels ( (2-1)(2-2)(2-3) ) show the two-
decoy-state case, where v1 = µ/2 , v2 = v1/10 . Bottom panels ( (2-4)(2-5)(2-6) )
show the case single-decoy-state, where v = µ/2 . Solid lines show finite-size secure-key
capacities with different N , which is the number of transmission signals. From left to
right, N gets bigger gradually. The dash line describe the trend of the infinite-size
secure-key capacities.
In decoy-state QKD scenarios, the intensity of decoy states is far weaker than signal
states [23, 45, 46, 47]. To maximize the security bound in any particular transmission
distance, in the original decoy-state HD-QKD protocol, v2, the intensity of the weaker
decoy state, is optimized. But in fact, when v2 is weak enough and fixed, we can’t
obviously distinguish the security bound with the optimized security bound. For
simplifying evaluation, we fix v2 at v2 = v1/10 , which is reasonable and doesn’t lose
generality.
According to Fig 2 and Fig 3, we can see that in the infinite-key regime, the
two-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol can achieve a longer transmission distance than
the single-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol under the same condition. We denote the
maximum transmission distance of the two-decoy-state protocol as L
{v1,v2}
N and the
maximum transmission distance of the single-decoy-state as L
{v}
N . Here L
{v1,v2}
N=∞ is
the maximum transmission of two-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol and L
{v}
N=∞ is the
maximum transmission of single-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol in the infinite-key
regime.
Comparing Subfigure 2-1 with 2-4, 2-2 with 2-5, 2-3 with 2-6 in Figure 2 and
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Figure 3: (Color online) Finite-size secure-key capacities in bpc versus transmission
distance based on Chernoff bound.
Subfigure 3-1 with 3-4, 3-2 with 3-5, 3-3 with 3-6 in Figure 3, we find that when the
number of signals N is small, the single-decoy-state protocol can achieve similar results
to the two-decoy-state protocol, i.e. in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-4, the secure-key capacity
and the maximum transmission distance are almost the same when N = 109, 1010 and
1011. With N increasing, L
{v}
N (L
{v1,v2}
N ) gets close to L
{v}
N=∞ (L
{v1,v2}
N=∞ ). When N gets big
enough, the results achieved in Figures demonstrate that the two-decoy-state HD-QKD
protocol has an obvious advantage over the single-decoy-state protocol. For example, in
Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-4, when N = 1011 , the results of two figures are still similar,
but when N = 1012, L
{v1,v2}
N is much greater than L
{v}
N .
We note that when N is fixed under the same condition, with the transmission
distance extending, the secure-key capacity estimated by Hoeffding’s inequality descends
faster in Figure 2 than that estimated by Chernoff bound in Figure 3. So we can get a
better effect in parameter estimation by using Chernoff bound than using Hoeffding’s
inequality in the finite-key decoy-state HD-QKD protocol. In particular, we consider
the single-decoy-state protocol in the case of d = 8, µ = 0.10 and d = 8, µ = 0.25.
The result is shown in Figure 4. We can see that in a short transmission distance, the
result estimated by Chernoff bound is not better than Hoeffding’s inequality. With the
transmission distance extending, the advantage of Chernoff bound gets more and more
obvious.
Ref.[25] has indicated that when the dimensionality is increased in the infinite-key
regime, the secure-key capacity would be promoted. Besides, if the intensity of source
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Figure 4: (Color online) (4-1) Chernoff bound and Hoeffding’s inequality in the single-
decoy-state protocol with the case d = 8, µ = 0.10 and N= 1012. (4-2) Chernoff
bound and Hoeffding’s inequality in the single-decoy-state protocol with the case d = 8,
µ = 0.25 and N= 1011.
is strong enough, the maximum transmission distance would be extended significantly.
To clarify the effect of the dimensionality under the constraint of finite keys, Figure 5
plots the secure-key capacity with Schmidt number d = 32 and µ = 0.01 in the single-
decoy-state HD-QKD protocol and Figure 6 plots the secure-key capacity with Schmidt
number d = 32 and µ = 0.10 and 0.25 in the two-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol.
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Figure 5: (Color online) Plot the secure-key
capacity of the single-decoy-state HD-QKD
protocol with the Schmidt number d = 32
and µ = 0.01.
In two-decoy-state HD-QKD proto-
col, by comparing Figure 3-4 with Figure 5
,Figure 3-2 with Figure 6-1, we can find
that when N is fixed, the 32-dimension
QKD protocol can achieve further trans-
mission distance than 8-dimension QKD
protocol. If the intensity of the source
is strong enough, using fewer signals in
32-dimension QKD protocol can reach or
even transcend the result that achieved by
more signals in 8-dimension QKD proto-
col. For example, in 32-dimension QKD
protocol with µ = 0.25, just 108 sig-
nals could achieve the better result than
that achieved in infinite-key regime in 8-
dimension QKD protocol. The details are shown in Figure 3-3 and Figure 6-2.
In realistic condition, when the transmission distance is settled, for increasing the
secure-key capacity and meanwhile maximizing the secure-key capacity with minimum
pulses, two authorized parties can choose an appropriate protocol and optimized
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Figure 6: (Color online) Plot the secure-key capacity of the two-decoy-state HD-QKD
protocol with the Schmidt number d = 32 and µ = 0.10 and 0.25.
parameters such as source intensities, channel noise and probabilities of choosing
measurement basis and ratios between signal states and decoy states.
6. Conclusions
We have used two methods to analyze the security against Gaussian collective attacks of
the HD-QKD protocol in the finite-key regime. By numerical evaluation, we have shown
that in a long transmission distance, more precise results could be achieved in parameter
estimation by using Chernoff bound. If the number of the signal pulses is small, the
single-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol could reach similar results to the two-decoy-state
protocol. Some assumptions are still needed to be noted. In particular, we require that
the detection probability of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement devices is independent of
their basis choice.
We just considered the case of HD-QKD with two decoy states and with one decoy
state, which is based on dispersive optics, but the arguments presented in this work
can be generalized to the case of multi-decoy-state HD-QKD protocol and other HD-
QKD protocols based on other degrees of freedom. When an experiment based on the
HD-QKD with decoy states is implemented practically, some parameters such as source
intensities, channel noise and probabilities in choosing measurement basis and ratios
between signal states and decoy states could be optimized so as to maximize secure-
key capacities. In realistic constraints, the method presented in this paper provides a
theoretical approach to optimized parameters so as to maximize the rate with minimum
resources.
Besides our methods, many other techniques, such as the random sampling
technique[48], are used in analyzing finite-size effect. So our future work will focus
on whether a tighter security bound could be obtained by other techniques, which is
worthy and necessary.
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